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THE GAZA STRIP: ISRAEL, ITS FOREIGN POLICY, AND THE GOLDSTONE
REPORT
Milena Sterio*
At the end of 2008, Israel launched a three-week military offensive
in the Gaza Strip (Operation Cast Lead), during which Israel carried out
over 2,360 air strikes and numerous ground assaults over Gaza, causing the
death of approximately 1,300 Palestinians, and wounding over 5, 000 indi-
viduals. The Gaza conflict sparked numerous allegations of war crimes and
international humanitarian law violations by both Israel and Hamas. Thus,
the Human Rights Council (HRC) appointed a U.N. Fact Finding Mission
on the Gaza Conflict (Goldstone Mission) led by prominent international
jurist Richard Goldstone. The Goldstone Mission issued the Goldstone Re-
port in September 2009, concluding that both Israel and Hamas committed
international law violations by indiscriminately targeting civilians. It is a
fair assertion that the Goldstone Report was met by controversy. Israel and
its most important allies, such as the United States, have condemned the
Report and have questioned its veracity and authenticity. Arab states, as
well as other, less Israel-friendly states, have hailed the Goldstone Report
as an important international legal document shedding light on internation-
al humanitarian law violations committed by Israeli forces and calling into
question the Israeli policy over Gaza. This Article will attempt to illuminate
the above debate, by examining the history of Israel and its policy vis-a-vis
the Gaza Strip, Operation Cast Lead itself and its aftermath, as well as the
relevant provisions international humanitarian law as they apply to the
Gaza Strip. This Article will conclude that the Goldstone Report, despite all
the controversy surrounding it, nonetheless represents an invaluable contri-
bution to international humanitarian law and to international relations in
their application to the volatile Middle East region.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 31, 2010, Israeli commandoes stormed an "activist" ship,
sailing in a flotilla of ships that were carrying aid and other activists to the
Gaza Strip, which had been blockaded by Israel and Egypt since 2007.1 The
activists were attempting to draw international support for Gaza, and to
spark further condemnation of the Israeli blockade. 2 In the raid, nine pas-
sengers were killed by the Israeli commandoes, dozens of activists were
wounded, and several Israeli soldiers were shot. International reaction was
swift; most countries condemned Israel, and even the U.S. President, Barack
Obama, voiced deep regret over the raid.4 Accounts of what exactly hap-
pened on the morning of May 31 vary. Israel claimed that the activists fired
first at Israeli soldiers, causing Israel to fire in self-defense, while activists
claimed the Israeli commandoes illegally boarded the activist ship and
opened fire.' What is undoubted is that Israel was involved in yet another
international incident involving Gaza where its soldiers opened fire and
killed several individuals. The May 31 incident fits into an existing para-
digm of internationally questionable Israeli military policy over Gaza, and
1 Amy Teibel and Tia Goldenberg, Israeli Commandos Storm Aid Flotilla; 9 Killed,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 31, 2010, available at http://newsgroups.derkeiler.com/Archive
/Soc/soc.retirement/2010-05/msg04927.html [hereinafter "Teibel & Goldenberg"].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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portrays Israel once again as the potential aggressor and occupier over the
Gaza strip.
In fact, at the end of 2008, Israel launched a three-week military of-
fensive in the Gaza Strip (Operation Cast Lead), during which Israel carried
out over 2,360 air strikes and numerous ground assaults over Gaza, causing
the death of approximately 1,300 Palestinians, and wounding over 5,000
individuals.7 The Gaza conflict sparked numerous allegations of war crimes
and international humanitarian law violations by both Israel and Hamas.
Thus, the Human Rights Council (HRC) appointed a U.N. Fact Finding
Mission on the Gaza Conflict (Goldstone Mission) led by prominent inter-
national jurist Richard Goldstone. The Goldstone Mission issued the Gold-
stone Report in September 2009, concluding that both Israel and Hamas
committed international law violations by indiscriminately targeting civi-
lians.9 The Goldstone Report requested that the U.N. Security Council call
on both Israel and Hamas to conduct investigations into war crimes allega-
tions over the Gaza conflict and recommended that if such investigations
were not undertaken, the Security Council should refer the Gaza situation to
the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor.' 0 The HRC accepted the
Goldstone Report's recommendations, and called upon all parties to ensure
their implementation."
It is a fair assertion that the Goldstone Report was met by contro-
versy. Israel and its most important allies, such as the United States, have
condemned the Report and have questioned its veracity and authenticity. 12
Arab states, as well as other, less Israel-friendly states, have hailed the
Goldstone Report as an important international legal document shedding
light on international humanitarian law violations committed by Israeli
forces and calling into question the Israeli policy over Gaza.' 3 This Article
will attempt to illuminate the above debate, by examining, in.Part II, the
history of Israel and its policy vis-i-vis the Gaza Strip. In Part III, this Ar-
ticle will briefly describe Operation Cast Lead, the events that preceded it,
6 Id.
7 Yatl Ronen, ICC Jurisdiction Over Acts Committed in the Gaza Strip, 8 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 3, 3-4 (2010).
8 Id. at 4.
9 Id. at 4-5.
'0 Id. at 5.
" Id.
12 See Michael Posner, U.S. Assistant Sec'y of State for Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, U.S. Response to the Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza
Conflict (Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://geneva.usmission.gov/news/2009/09/29/gaza-
conflict/ (arguing that the report is "deeply flawed and disagree[ing] sharply with its metho-
dology and many of its recommendations").
13 See, e.g., UN Report Clear Proofs of Israel's War Crimes, EZZEDEEN AL-QASSAM
BRIGADES (Palestine) Sept. 16, 2009, available at http://www.qassam.ps/news-1840-UN
report clearproofsofIsraelswar crimes.html.
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the actual warfare, and its aftermath. Part IV of this Article will focus on
international humanitarian law, and specifically, the violations thereof that
have been alleged in Gaza. Part V will describe the Goldstone Report, its
main conclusions, and the reasoning behind such conclusions. Ultimately,
Part VI will attempt to place the Goldstone Report in the larger context of
international law, by analyzing its contributions to international humanita-
rian law, its reliance on the ICC, and its implications for foreign policy in
the Middle East. This Article will conclude that the Goldstone Report, de-
spite all the controversy surrounding it, nonetheless represents an invaluable
contribution to the body of international law and to international relations in
their application to the volatile Middle East region.
II. ISRAEL AND GAZA: HISTORY, POLICY AND WAR
The Gaza Strip used to be part of the British Mandate for Palestine,
and was destined to become part of a larger Palestinian Arab state. 14 How-
ever, that plan never materialized, and Gaza fell under Egyptian administra-
tion after the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948.15 In the so-called Six Day War
of 1967, Israel seized control of the Gaza Strip, establishing a military gov-
ernment in this region.16 Israel's claim was that since Israel did not displace
a sovereign state when it took control over Gaza, Gaza was not an "occu-
pied" territory within the meaning of international law.' 7 Thus, Israel
claimed that Gaza was simply "administered" by Israel.'8 This position,
however, was rejected by the international community, which came to view
Israel as an occupier.' 9
In 2005, Israel dismantled its settlements and withdrew its land-
based military forces from Gaza.20 Consequently, Israel reaffirmed its claim
that Gaza was not an occupied territory, and that Israel had no specific obli-
gations toward the Gazan population.2 ' This position is untenable under
14 George E. Bisharat, Israel's Invasion of Gaza in International Law, 38 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 41, 47 (2009).
'5 Id.
16 Id
17 Id; see also Yehuda Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status ofJudea
and Samaria, 3 ISR. L. REv. 279 (1968) (discussing that this idea has sometimes been re-
ferred to as the "missing reversioner" thesis).
18 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 47.
' Id at 47-48 (noting that Israel's status as occupier of Gaza has been confirmed by the
International Court of Justice, the Oslo Accords, the Israeli Supreme Court, the U.N. Security
Council, the U.N. General Assembly, and the U.S. State Department).
20 Id. at 48.
21 According to the Disengagement Plan prepared by the government of Israel before the
withdrawal from Gaza, "Upon completion of this process, there shall no longer be any per-
manent presence of Israel security forces or Israeli civilians in the areas of the Gaza Strip. ...
As a result, there will be no basis for claiming that the Gaza Strip is occupied territory."
232 [Vol. 43:229
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international law. Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations (Hague Regula-
tions) sets forth the "effective control" test for establishing occupation.22
Under this test, "[T]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually
placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only
to the territory where such authority is established and can be exercised" 23
Under this test, however, the presence of permanent military forces is not
required in the occupied territory. The Nuremberg Tribunal, in applying this
test, held that occupation continues, even though the occupier has with-
drawn its military forces from the occupied territory, if the occupier can re-
enter the occupied territory and exercise effective control at will.24 Israel
certainly retains the ability to re-enter Gaza, and to exercise effective con-
trol over this territory at will.2 5 Israel maintains authority over Gaza pur-
suant to the Revised Disengagement Plan.26 Moreover, Israel patrols Gaza's
airspace, Israeli naval ships patrol Gaza's territorial waters, and Israel regu-
larly conducts military operations within Gaza itself.27 Operation Cast Lead,
mentioned above, was yet another example of Israeli military operations in
Gaza after the former's "disengagement" from Gaza. 28 Finally, Israel is in
full control over the movement of people and goods to and from Gaza and is
able to shut crossings from Gaza at will. 29 Israel controls Gaza's telecom-
munication networks, electricity, and sewage systems, as well as its popula-
tion registry. 30 The latter allows Israel to determine which individuals will
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Disengagement Plan-General Outline (Apr. 18,
2004), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/
Disengagement+Plan+-+General+Outline.htm [hereinafter Disengagement Plan]. The Israeli
High Court has also held that the Gaza Strip was no longer occupied. See HCJ 9132/07 Jaber
v. Prime Minister [2008] (Isr.). Moreover, in a Revised Disengagement Plan, Israel has stated
that "[t]he completion of the plan will serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel's responsi-
bility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip." Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Revised
Disengagement Plan (June 6, 2004), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+
Process/Reference+Do6uments/Revised+Disengagement+Plan+6-June-2004.htm [hereinafter
Revised Disengagement Plan].
22 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), art 42,
Oct.18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague IV].
23 Id.
24 U.S. v. Wilhelm List, et al. (Hostages Trial), 15 I.L.R. 646 (Nuremberg Military Tri-
bunal 1948).
25 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 49.
26 The Revised Disengagement Plan states that "Israel will guard and monitor the external
land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air-
space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza
Strip." Revised Disengagement Plan, supra note 21, § 3.
27 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 49.
28 For a detailed description of Operation Cast Lead, see infra Part III.
29 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other
Occupied Arab Territories, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/17 (Jan. 21, 2008) (prepared by John
Dugard) [hereinafter Human Rights Situation in Palestine].
30 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 50.
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be accorded, and denied, legal residency in Gaza.3 ' Thus, the degree of con-
trol, which Israel still exercises over Gaza, clearly demonstrates that Israel
has not ended its occupation of Gaza.
As an occupier, Israel has specific international legal obligations
toward the people of Gaza. These obligations are detailed in several treaties,
including the Hague Convention (II) respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land and the Hague Regulations of 1907, the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of
1949 (Fourth Geneva Convention), as well as in customary norms of inter-
national law.3 2 "As a general matter, these regulations are designed to re-
duce the impact of military occupation on civilian life to the maximum ex-
tent possible, while preserving the freedom of the occupier to act according
to military necessity." 3 Article 43 of the Hague Regulations requires that
the occupier "take all steps in his power to re-establish and insure, as far as
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely pre-
vented, the laws in force in the country." 3 4 The Fourth Geneva Convention
designates civilians who fall under the power and control of the occupier as
"protected persons."35 The occupier, pursuant to this Convention, must en-
sure their basic welfare, and must treat civilians humanely.3 6 For example,
occupiers may not willfully kill or otherwise mistreat protected persons,
must ensure that protected persons are supplied with food and medical ne-
cessities, and must care for the well-being and education of children. 37 More
specifically, if food and other necessities in the occupied territory become
inadequate, the occupier must permit the entry of humanitarian relief.3 8
Israel, as the occupier of Gaza, is obligated under international law
to fulfill the above-described duties.39 In the case of Gaza, Israel violated its
international obligations under the law of occupation, before, during, and
after Operation Cast Lead. For example, before and after Operation Cast
Lead, Israel maintained a blockade of the Gaza Strip, rejecting humanitarian
31 Id.
32 Convention Regarding the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), art. 43, July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. 403 [hereinafter Hague II]; Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
3 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 51.
34 Hague II, supra note 32, art. 43.
3s Geneva Convention IV, supra note 32, art. 4.
36 Id. art. 3. This article is found in all four Geneva Conventions, and is often referred to as
common article 3.
37 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 32, arts. 49, 50, 55.
38 Id. art. 60.
39 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 51 (noting that "[aill of these duties were incumbent upon
Israel in its occupation of the Gaza Strip").
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aid for Gaza and thereby forcing the Gazan population into poverty.40
Moreover, Israel has treated Operation Cast Lead as an international armed
conflict, and has invoked its inherent right of self-defense against Hamas
attacks on southern Israel.41 Yet, because Israel is the occupier of Gaza, and
because Gaza is not a sovereign, independent state, any military action in
Gaza must be treated as a law enforcement action, and not as an internation-
al conflict.4 2 In other words, an occupier has specific duties toward the oc-
cupied territory and the population therein, which may preclude the occupi-
er from engaging in armed conflict-type military operations in the occupier
territory. "While an occupying force has a duty and a right to maintain pub-
lic order in an occupied territory, its obligation to protect the civilian popu-
lation implies limits on the amount of force that can be lawfully employed
to fulfill that duty."4 3 For example, under the law of occupation, the occupi-
er is required "to seek to arrest, rather than kill, members of armed groups
suspected of carrying out attacks, and to use the minimum amount of force
necessary in countering any security threat."" Most Israeli military actions
fall outside of the law enforcement model, and Israel itself has consistently
denied its occupation of Gaza and has cast its military action within the pa-
radigm of international warfare.45
While it is true that all military operations in occupied territories are
different, and that Israel, because of its 2005 disengagement from Gaza, is
no longer in charge of the daily administration of the Strip, these facts on
their own do not call for a complete alteration of the law of occupation, or
for the application of the law of armed conflict over the law of occupation.
Israel as the occupier would prefer that the law of armed conflict be applied
in Gaza, because:
[I]t is by virtue of superior military strength that occupiers become occupi-
ers; it is to be expected, therefore, that they would press for legal standards
that permit them to exploit their military advantage. It is, moreover, com-
40 Id. at 58 (noting the poverty level in Gaza due to the Israeli blockade and the fact that
Israel had rejected humanitarian supplies before).
41 In fact, on the first day of Operation Cast Lead, Israel's U.N. Ambassador stated in a
letter to the U.N. Secretary General that "the government of Israel has decided to exercise, as
of this morning, its right to self-defense." Victor Kattan, Gaza: Not a War of Self-Defense,
JURIST, Jan. 15, 2009, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/01/gaza-not-war-
of-self-defense.php [hereinafter Katan]. Similarly, Israeli foreign Minister Tzipi Livni as-
serted that "Israel has the right to defend itself." Tzipi Livni, Israel Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, Briefing in Sderot-Opening Remarks (Dec. 28, 2008), available at http://www.mfa.
gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+eaders/2008/FMLivni briefingSderot Op
ening_remarks_28-Dec-2008.htm [hereinafter Livni Briefing].
42 See Bisharat, supra note 14, at 54-56.
43 Id. at 51.
4 Id at 51-52.
45 See id. at 47 (referring to Israeli denial of its status as occupier of Gaza). See also dis-
cussion infra Part III (discussing Operation Cast Lead).
2010] 235
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paratively easy for any occupying power to manufacture circumstances
that could be presented to the outside world to justify the use of military
force on a large scale and to be judged according to the "armed conflict"
standard. 46
In fact, it appears unfair to permit Israel to maintain its effective occupation
of the Gaza Strip, while allowing it to use massive military force against the
Gaza resident, under the standards of law of armed conflict. 4 7 "It forces the
people of Gaza Strip to face one of the most powerful militaries in the world
without the benefit either of its own military, or of any realistic means to
acquire the means to defend itself."4 8
Whether treated under the law of armed conflict standard, or the
law of occupation criteria, Israeli military actions during Operation Cast
Lead violated fundamental rules and principles of international humanita-
rian law.
III. OPERATION CAST LEAD
The war in Gaza at the end of 2008 was not a true war; rather, it
was a culmination of conflicts and skirmishes that had been simmering for a
long time. As mentioned above, Israel withdrew its military forces and set-
tlers from Gaza in 2005, claiming that it was ending its four-decade long
occupation of Gaza.4 9 The daily administration of this region was thus left
to the Palestinian Authority, and in January 2006, a Hamas-affiliated party,
"Change and Reform," won the majority of legislative seats in the Palestini-
an Legislative Council, earning the right to form the next cabinet.o Despite
Israeli and American-led sanctions and protests, Prime Minister Mahmoud
Abbas of Fatah joined Hamas officials in creating a unity government in
early 2007.51 As a response to the Hamas ascension to power, Israel im-
posed a blockade on the Gaza Strip, which resulted in abject poverty for the
population of Gaza.52 A human rights group described the humanitarian
crisis in Gaza as follows:
46 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 55-56.
4 Id. at 56.
48 Id
49 Id. at 56-57.
50 See, e.g., Scott Wilson, Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace
Efforts in Mideast, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2006, at Al.
See West Bank & Gaza Country Brief, THE WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/WESTBANKGAZAEXTN/O,,contentMD
K:2014975 1-menuPK:294370-pagePK: 1497618-piPK:217854-theSitePK:294365,00.html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
52 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 58.
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As a result of the [blockade], the stocks of imported food products in Gaza
are dwindling, driving their prices sky-high, while fruit and vegetables that
were intended for export are being sold in Gazan markets at a loss. Many
families cannot afford to buy them, however, due to the high poverty rate
in Gaza. 80 percent of Gazan households now live below the poverty line.
. . 80 percent of all Gazan families would literally starve without food aid
from international agencies.53
A blockade can be described as an act of war under international
customary law.5 4 The legality of any blockade under international customa-
ry law depends on whether the occupier is allowing the free passage of aid
for the civilian population.'5 Israel has claimed that its blockade of Gaza
was necessary in order to pressure Hamas to cease the firing of rockets into
southern Israel.56 However, there is no reasonable relationship between the
blockade, depriving Gazan civilians of food and basic medical necessities,
and the ceasing of Hamas' bombings of Israeli territories. In fact, as occupi-
er, Israel is obligated under Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention to
allow the passage of humanitarian aid toward the Gazan population. The
blockade clearly violated the Fourth Geneva Convention, and has, moreo-
ver, raised concerns that it was a form of collective punishment against the
Gazan population, which is prohibited under Article 33 of the Fourth Gene-
va Convention.58 It appears therefore that Israel instituted a blockade of the
Gaza Strip in response to Hamas' rise to power in this region; as such, Israel
engaged in an act of war against its occupied territory, before Operation
Cast Lead commenced.59
Hamas and Israel reached an official ceasefire agreement on June
19, 2008.60 This agreement required both sides to cease their military opera-
53 Id. at 59 (quoting The Gaza Strip: The Siege on Gaza and Intensified Economic Sanc-
tions, B'TSELEM, http://www.btselem.org/english/gazastrip/siege.asp (last visited Oct. 10,
2010)).
54 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 408 (Peter MacAlister-Smith ed., Max
Planck Inst. for Comparative Public Law and Int'l Law Under the Direction of Rudolf Bern-
hardt 2000).
5s CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOLUME I: RULES 189 (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter Customary IHL 1].
56 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 60.57 id.
58 Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states that "No protected person may be
punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and
likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism . . . against protected persons and their
property are prohibited." Geneva Convention IV, supra note 32, art. 33. A blockade against
a civilian population, like the Israeli blockade of Gaza, raises concerns of collective punish-
ment, because of the effect that the blockade will have on the population, threatening, in the
long run, the latter's survival.
5 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 60-61.
6 Israel and Hamas "Agree Truce," BBC NEWS, June 18, 2008, available at http://
2010] 237
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61tions and attacks, and Israel to ease its blockade of Gaza. Israel did not
abide by the latter obligation, and maintained tight control over Gazan bor-
ders, a fact which was deplored by major human rights groups. 6 2 On No-
vember 4, 2008, Israeli troops killed six Palestinians in Gaza.63 Before this
event, rocket attacks from Gaza on southern Israel had stopped almost com-
pletely.64 Many had noted that the ceasefire agreement had been extremely
effective, and that Hamas had truly abided by the terms of the agreement.6 5
However, after Israeli military operations on November 4, Hamas rocket
attacks picked up again, prompting Israel to engage in Operation Cast
Lead.
As mentioned above, Israel characterized Operation Cast Lead as
self-defense. 7 Israel accused Hamas of breaking the ceasefire agreement,
and then invoked its right, as a state, to self-defend. 6 8 This argument, how-
ever, fails under international law for several reasons.
First, as described above, it is doubtful that Hamas broke the cease-
fire agreement. It is much more likely that it was Israel that actually disres-
pected the terms of the agreement by refusing to ease up the blockade and
by engaging in the November 4, 2008, attacks in Gaza.6 9 Hamas rocket
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/7459200.stm.
61 id
62 In fact, on November 9, 2008, Human Rights Watch issued a letter to Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Ohnert, which stated that "[tihe latest measures are part of an ongoing policy
by your government hat has prevented the normal flow of goods and people in and out of
Gaza since January 2006. It has contributed to a humanitarian crisis, deepened poverty and
ruined the economy .... Israel made a commitment in June to ease some of these restrictions
- but the movement of goods into Gaza and people in and out of the territory remains a frac-
tion of what it was when borders were last opened for free trade." Human Rights Watch,
Letter to Olmert: Stop the Blockade of Gaza, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/
1 1/20/letter-olmert-stop-blockade-gaza.
63 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 62.
6 Rocket attacks from Gaza totaled one in July, September and October of 2008, and eight
in August. Nancy Kanwisher, Johannes Haushofer & Anat Biletzki, Reigniting Violence:
How Do Ceasefires End?, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 6, 2009, available at http://
huffingtonpoast.com/nancy-kanwisher/reigniting-violence-how-d b_155611 .html.
65 Thus, MIT professor Nancy Kanwisher remarked that the ceasefire agreement had been
"remarkably effective," and that "the rate of rocket and mortar fire from gaza dropped to
almost zero, and stayed there for months." Id.
6 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 61-62.
67 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
68 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 194 (July 9) (Israel claimed the Barrier was
"wholly consistent with the right of States to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the
Charter"). Under the U.N. Charter, every state has the right to act in self-defense if it is a
target of an "armed attack" by another state, and if its exercise of self-defense is necessary
and proportional (limited in scope to respond to the harm that the attacked state suffered).
U.N. Charter art. 51.
69 See Bisharat, supra note 14, at 65.
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launches after November 4, 2008, can be viewed as responses to Israel's
decision to break the peace agreement. Under these conditions, Israel may
not claim self-defense.7 0
Second, because Israel is the occupier of Gaza, it is doubtful that it
can invoke the self-defense argument, which exists within the paradigm of
the law of armed conflict and thus applies to wars fought between sovereign
states. 7 1 An occupier, if facing violence by inhabitants of the occupied terri-
tory, can certainly engage in military efforts to quell the violence; however,
the occupier cannot claim self-defense and must limit its military response
72to law enforcement operations.
Third, in order for Israel to claim the right of self-defense, it must
have, under the rules of international law, suffered an armed attack. Israel
itself attacked Gaza on November 4, 2008, provoked Hamas, and drove the
Gazan population into poverty.7 4 Thus, it was not a victim of armed attack
and could not claim the right of self-defense.
Fourth, the Israeli military response in Gaza, even if it had consti-
tuted a legitimate exercise of self-defense, was neither necessary nor pro-
portional. Operation Cast Lead was not necessary, as Israel could have at
least attempted to renegotiate the peace agreement, and should have in good
faith abided by the terms of the agreement. In fact, Hamas leaders had
offered to consider renewing the truce if Israel lifted the blockade of the
Gaza Strip. 7 6 Israeli Foreign Minister Livni publicly stated that Israel was
not interested in prolonging the truce with Hamas, because the truce "harms
the Israeli strategic goal, empowers Hamas, and gives the impression that
Israel recognizes the movement." 77 Israel thus chose to use military force,
because continuing on the peaceful path would have implied that Israel rec-
ognized Hamas as a legitimate government of Gaza. Moreover, Operation
Cast Lead was not proportional to the harm that it sought to redress. Even if
it were true that Israel had suffered an armed attack, its response had to be
70 See Id. ("No state can launch an attack, and then point to the retaliation for that attack as
the trigger for a claim of self-defense, unless, for example, the retaliation involved a signifi-
cant escalation of violence over the initial attack").
7' Id. at 64-65.
72 See id (discussing the right to use force as a police power and not as an exercise of self-
defense).
7 See U.N. Charter, art. 51.
74 See Bisharat, supra note 14and accompanying text.
7 See Id at 66.
76 Hamas May Consider New Truce with Israel, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Dec. 24, 2008,
available at 2008 WLNR 24654389 ("Hamas is ready to renew the truce 'if Israel respects
the conditions of a ceasefire."').
77 NORMAN G. FINKELSTEIN, THIS TIME WE WENT Too FAR: TRUTH & CONSEQUENCES OF
THE GAZA INVASION 50 (2010) (explaining that a ceasefire could spotlight Hamas's "pragmat-
ism in word and deed" and cause international pressure on Israel).
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limited to targets necessary to stop rocket launching from Gaza. However,
"Operation Cast Lead seemed calculated to achieve objectives considerably
beyond stopping rocket fire from Gaza-a fact reflected both in statements
by Israeli officials, and in Israel's choice of targets during the fighting."
Thus, even if Israel did have a right of self-defense, its military operations
in Gaza exceeded the valid scope of this right and thereby violated interna-
tional law.80
Operation Cast Lead formally began on December 27, 2008, when
Israel began aerial bombardment of the Gaza Strip.8 ' A ground invasion
followed, beginning on January 3, 2009.82 Palestinian casualties mounted
rapidly, as did allegations of violations of international humanitarian law
rules by Israeli soldiers, who, allegedly, used disproportionate force, failed
to distinguish between military and civilian targets, and used white phos-
phorous shells.83 On January 8, 2009, the U.N. Security Council passed a
resolution, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities by both Israel
and Hamas.84 The war continued until January 18, 2009, when both parties
instituted unilateral ceasefires, ultimately ending ongoing hostilities.85 The
destruction and death toll caused by Operation Cast Lead were enormous,
calling into question Israel's respect of international humanitarian law
rules. The section below examines such rules as they apply to the conflict
in Gaza.
78 See JEFFREY L. DuNoFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 862 (2002 ed.) [hereinafter
DUNOFF ET AL.] (explaining that proportionality "precludes a state from using force beyond
that necessary to repel an attack or to restore the status quo ante").
7 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 67.
80 Id.
81 See Rory McCarthy & Ewen MacAskill, Israel Pounds Hamas in Gaza: Government
Buildings Destroyed in Latest Air Strikes: Hospitals Overflow with Casualties as Civilian
Death Toll Mounts, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, Dec. 30, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 27778472
("Israel has continued bombing Gaza for a fourth day .. . threatening a drawn-out conflict.").
82 See Isabel Kershner & Taghreed el-Khodary, Israeli Tanks and Troops Launch Attack
on Gaza, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at Al, available at 2009 WLNR 152598 ("Israeli tanks
and troops swept across the border into Gaza on Saturday night, opening a ground war
against the militant group Hamas after a week of intense airstrikes.").
83 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 42.
8 S.C. Res. 1860, S[RES/1860 (Jan. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscresolutions09.htm (follow "S/RES/1860 (2009)" hyperlink)
(last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (calling for "an immediate, durable and fully respected ceasefire,
leading to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza").
85 Isabel Kershner, Few Israelis Near Gaza Feel War Achieved Much, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 2009, at A8, available at 2009 WLNR 1150354.
86 See UN to Embark on Humanitarian Assessment in Post-Conflict Gaza, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 1237274 (quoting U.N. Secretary General
Ban-ki Moon's description of the attacks on Gaza as "shocking and alarming" and saying
that "[tihese are heartbreaking scenes").
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IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO
GAZA
During Operation Cast Lead, Israel violated several international
humanitarian law rules. The sections below will detail Israeli violations of
some of the most fundamental rules of international humanitarian law,
which include the duty of distinction or discrimination, the principle of pro-
portionality, and illegal uses of weapons. This section will conclude that
because of an overall death toll and destruction caused in Gaza by Opera-
tion Cast Lead, this military campaign appears to have been led without
regard for the most fundamental rules and principles of the laws of war.
A. Duty ofDistinction or Discrimination
First, Israel violated its duty to discriminate between civilian and
non-civilian targets.87 In fact, the Israeli commanders designated all institu-
tions and individuals associated with Hamas as legitimate military targets, a
designation which, on its own, violates international law.88 Second, Israeli
commanders ordered their troops to employ extremely liberal rules of en-
gagement. Third, Israeli troops used indiscriminate weapons, which caused
excessive suffering to the Gazan population.
1. Israeli failure to distinguish between civilian and non-civilian tar-
gets
The duty of distinction or discrimination states as follows: "[T]he
parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and
combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must
not be directed at civilians."90 This fundamental rule of international huma-
nitarian law is codified in the 1863 Lieber Code, in the 1907 Hague Con-
vention, the Fourth Geneva Convnetion, and the 1977 Additional Protocols
to the Geneva Convention, inter alia.9' The U.N. General Assembly con-
firmed this duty, stating that parties in a conflict must not "launch attacks
against the civilian populations as such," and must not adopt "means of in-
juring the enemy" which are "unlimited." 92 Israel's own Law of War book-
let confirms this principle, stating that "the IDF accepts and applies the
87 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 70.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Customary IHL I, supra note 55, at 3.
91 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 70.
92 G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7433 (Dec. 19, 1968), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r23.htm (follow "A/RES/2444(XXIII)" hyperlink)
(last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (calling for respect for human rights in armed conflicts).
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principle of distinction."93 In order to apply the rule of discrimination, a
military commander must thus distinguish between armed forces and civi-
lians. The former are defined under international law as "all organized
armed forces, groups, and units, which are under a command responsible to
that party for the conduct of its subordinates."9 4 Consequently, "persons
who do not take a direct part in the hostilities of a non-international armed
conflict enjoy protection against attack while persons who take a direct part
in hostilities are liable to lawful attack." 95 If a military commander refuses
to obey the rule of discrimination, he or she may face individual criminal
liability. 96 Violations of the rule of discrimination may include maneuvers
such as the intentional targeting of civilians as such, attacks that are indi-
scriminate in nature, as well as indiscriminate attacks in which the military
commander knows of the danger posed to civilians in the targeted area.9 7
The 1949 Geneva Convention specifies as a "grave breach" the acts of
"willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment . . . willfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body or health . . . not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly."98
During the three-week long attack on Gaza, Israeli forces targeted
numerous civilian objectives, such as schools, U.N. headquarters, religious
institutions, courts, prisons, police stations, fire houses, and infrastructure
points, such as roads, bridges, harbors, etc.99 Cultural sites were also tar-
geted, as well as the Gaza zoo, where many animals were fatally shot.100
Israeli forces strongly attacked the Gaza industry and private sector, target-
ing farms and factories and literally destroying the Gazan population's eco-
nomic viability.'0o For most of these targets, Israel alleged some link to
93 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 71.
94 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOL. I: RULES 25, at 14 (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY IHL I] (rule 4); see
also Geneva Convention IV, supra note 32, art. 3 ("Persons taking no part in the hostilities
. .. shall in all circumstances be treated humanely.").
9s RED CROSS SYMPOSIUM: PROTECTING CIVILIANS IN 2 1ST- CENTURY WARFARE 13 (Mi-
reille Hector & Martine Jellema eds., 2001) (defining "direct part in hostilities" as "acts
which are intended to cause actual harm" such as the use of weapons).
96 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 71.
97 Id.
98 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 32, art. 147; see also CUSTOMARY IHL I, supra note
55, at 601.
9 See, e.g., Jonathan Cook, Israel's Doctrine of Destruction, PALESTINE CHRONICLE, Jan.
20, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 1122504 (according to one senior Israeli official, "[t]here
are many aspects of Hamas, and we are trying to hit the whole spectrum because everything
is connected and everything supports terrorism against Israel").
'0 Gaza Prayer Turns Deadly as Israel Hits Mosques, AL ARABIYA, Jan. 6, 2009,
available at http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/01/06/63609.html; Ashraf Helmi, Israeli
Troops Shot and Killed Zoo Animals, GULFNEWS (U.A.E.), Jan. 25, 2009, available at
http://gulfniews.com/region/Middle East/10278858.html.
101 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 72.
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Hamas. For example, the office of the Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Ha-
niyeh was designated as a 'terror target," because it "served as a planning,
support, and finance center for terrorist activity."1 0 2 Similarly, the Islamic
University of Gaza was targeted in six separate air strikes, because Israeli
officials claimed that the University housed a weapons research center.' 03
When this claim was refuted, Israel alternatively claimed that this Universi-
ty was a cultural icon for Hamas students and militants. 0
However, a civilian object is not transformed into a legitimate mili-
tary target simply because it supports political opinions that the attacker
finds dangerous. 05 Moreover, even if a facility is a so-called dual use build-
ing, thus combining features of a civilian and military target, it may only be
targeted if it serves a fundamental military function. o0 Finally, if in doubt,
the attacker must assume that a target is a non-military objective, and must
abstain from attacking it.107 The Israeli position during Operation Cast
Lead-that Hamas is a terrorist organization and that anything or anyone
associated with Hamas is a legitimate target-is unsupported in internation-
al law.108 The terrorist designation of Hamas has no bearing on Israel's ob-
ligations and duties under international humanitarian law, and Israel was
still under the duty to discriminate between civilian and military targets.109
The Israeli targeting practice clearly violated all of the above rules, and
even if Israel had serious doubts about the role and use of some of the build-
ings that it targeted, it had a duty under international humanitarian law to
first investigate to substantiate its claim before striking in a military fashion.
2. Liberal rules of engagement
News media covering the conflict in Gaza reported numerous at-
tacks on civilians. At the least, these attacks suggest that civilians were de-
liberately targeted, and this supports the conclusion that Israeli troops ab-
102 Amos Harel & Avi Issacharoff, IAF Bombs 3 Gaza Government Buildings; Officials: 25
Wounded, HA'ARETZ, Jan. 1, 2009, available at http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1051305.
html (Israeli warplanes bombed Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh's office a second time
in a separate attack during the offensive).
103 Id.
'04 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 73.
105 Id. at 74.
106 id.
107 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), arts. 48, 52(2), June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] ("In case of doubt whether an
object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes . .. is being used to make an effective
contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.").
108 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 75.
109 Id.
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ided by liberal rules of engagement.o10 In fact, Israeli soldiers themselves
confirmed that they were ordered to "[f]ire on anything that moves," and "to
shoot first and ask questions later." 1 For example, in one of the deadliest
attacks during Operation Cast Lead, occurring in the al-Zeitouna district of
Gaza City in the beginning of January 2009, Israeli forces "reduced the
eastern Gaza City suburb to little more than ruble in a matter of days."ll 2
Moreover, some families were particularly targeted, with almost seventy
members of the same clan killed. In another deadly attack on a town in
southern Gaza, the village of Khuza was attacked over several hours, and
several women, children, and elderly people were killed.' 14 Reports indicate
that during this attack, civilians were shot at indiscriminately, homes were
being destroyed with residents still inside, and some civilians were targeted
by snipers and killed.115
It is true that Israel used a variety of warning methods to alert resi-
dents of the Gaza Strip about the upcoming attacks, such as dropping leaf-
lets and cell phone messaging.1 16 Israeli troops would also "knock on the
roof," by directing artillery fire at corners of buildings, as a warning to indi-
viduals inside that a more powerful attack was forthcoming." 7 Israel as-
serted that Palestinian civilians who did not abide by these warnings were
acting as "voluntary human shields," and were thus taking part in hostilities
and could be targeted as combatants." 8 While these warning indicate that
Israel did attempt to respect the duty of discrimination, their application in
the case of Gaza is problematic. In fact, Israel blockaded and fenced the
entire region of Gaza, and closed all exit points from the Strip during Op-
eration Cast Lead."'9 Thus, those Palestinian civilians who wished to abide
by the warnings simply had nowhere to go. Finally, the claim that a civilian
110 Id.
1 Sheera Frenkel, Israeli Soldiers Recall Gaza Attack Orders, TIMES ONLINE (London),
Jan. 28, 2009, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middleeast/article
5601177.ece [hereinafter Frenkel] (quoting an anonymous Israeli soldier).
112 Id. (an Israeli soldier spoke of the offensive, "[w]e pounded Zeitoun into the ground").
113 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 76-77.
4Id.at 77.
1 Fida Qishta & Peter Beaumont, Israeli Accused of War Crimes Over 12-hour Assault on
Gaza Village, OBSERVER, Jan. 18, 2009, available at 2008 WLNR 24879553 (one civilian
recalled, "[the Israeli soldiers] wanted to bury us alive").
116 Abraham Rabinovich, Israel Warning Civilians to Flee, THE AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 30,
2008, at 7, available at 2008 WLNR 24879553 (including phone calls and leaflets dropped
from aircraft).
117 George Bisharat, Israel on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2009, at Al9, available at 2009
WLNR 6331259 ("Israeli gunners 'knocked on roofs'-that is, fired first at corners of build-
ings, before hitting more vulnerable points-to 'warn' Palestinian residents to flee.").
118 Id. ("Israeli military lawyers instructed army commanders that Palestinians who re-
mained in a targeted building after having been warned to leave were 'voluntary human
shields,' and thus combatants.").
119 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 79.
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automatically becomes a combatant if he or she does not leave a structure
despite a warning the structure would be attacked is unsupported in interna-
tional law.
3. Indiscriminate use of weapons
Israeli forces chose less precise weapons in their strikes on the Gaza
Strips, thereby causing the death and suffering of more civilians than if
more precise weapons had been used. Reports indicate that Israeli troops
fired so-called 155-millimeter howitzers into densely populated areas; such
shells have a margin of error of thirty meters and a blast radius of 300 me-
ters.12 0 Thus, such shells cause indiscriminate killings and suffering of civi-
lians in heavily populated areas. Because Israel allegedly had alternatives-
shells that are GPS-guided and very accurate-its choice of less precise
weapons in civilian areas indicates a violation of the duty to discriminate
between civilian and military targets.12 1
B. The Principle ofProportionality
The proportionality principle recognizes that the attacker may at
times legitimately use force in civilian areas, so long as the military advan-
tage gained from such an attack is greater than the harm caused to civi-
lians.12 2 In other words, "the costs of war must not outweigh the bene-
fits." 1 23 The proportionality principle is enshrined in both treaty law, such as
the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (Additional Protocol
1) as well as customary international law.124 This principle applies both to
rules about the initiation of war and the use of justified force (jus ad bel-
120 Ben Hubbard & Alfred de Montesquieu, Rights Groups Says Laws of War violated in
Gaza, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 4, 2009, available at Westlaw, 2/4/09 AP Alert - Bus.
13:00:12 ("Israel's choice of such weapons over more precise alternatives raises questions of
intention.").
121 Id. (Human Rights Watch criticized Israel's use of less precise weapons, "[w]hen you
have an alternative that is GPD-guided and very accurate, why would you use a shell that is
much less accurate and has a much larger kill radius?"). It should be noted that other coun-
tries have been criticized in the past over their use of less precise weapons in populated civi-
lian areas. For example, NATO countries were criticized and even sued in the International
Court of Justice over their use of weapons in the 1999 air strikes on the former Yugoslavia.
See, e.g., DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 79, at 543-44.
122 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 82.
123 JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JusT WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR 204 (1981)
in Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
391, 391 n.1 (1993).
124 Additional Protocol I, supra note 107, art. 51(5)(b) (defining and prohibiting indiscri-
minate attacks )("[A]n attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."). See also
Customary IHL I, supra note 55, at 46, 58 (referencing Rules 14 and 18).
2452010]
HeinOnline  -- 43 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 245 2010-2011
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
lum), as well as to the way a war is conducted, once initiated (jus in bel-
lo).125 The proportionality principle obliges military commanders to perform
the proportionality calculus before launching a military operation; if the
proportionality calculus isn't satisfied, the military commander should ab-
andon the proposed military operation. "Launching an attack which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohi-
bited." 26 The violation of this principle exposes military commanders to
individual criminal liability.127
The difficulty in relation to the principle of proportionality lies with
its application. An analysis of proportionality tends to focus on what legiti-
mate military objectives are, what military advantage means, and how to
balance this advantage against incidental harm to civilians.128 A military
target is such that "by [its] nature, location, purpose or use [it] make[s] an
effective contribution to military action[s]," and that the "total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the
time, offers a definite military advantage." 2 9 For example, combatants are
legitimate military objectives, as well as civilians taking direct participation
in hostilities.130 With relation to buildings, Additional Protocol I specifically
states that "[I]n case of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicat-
ed to civilian purposes .. . is being used to make an effective contribution to
military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used."' 3 ' In addition, Addi-
tional Protocol I requires that the military advantage sought in the attack be
"concrete and direct." 3 2 The travaux preparatoires to Additional Protocol I
indicate that "concrete and direct" advantage means "substantial and rela-
tively close," and that long-term military advantages which are "hardly per-
ceptible" should not be pursued by military commanders.13 3 Finally, with
regard to incidental harm caused to civilians by the military attack, attack
125 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 82; see also id. at 82, n. 274 (explaining that the principle of
proportionality is not identical in its application to the rules of war as opposed to the right of
self-defense).
126 Customary IHL I, supra note 55, at 46.
127 See id. at 568-69.
121 William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offense, 7 DUKE J.
CouP. & INT'L L.. 539, 545 (1997).
129 Additional Protocol I, supra note 107, art. 52(2).
30 Id. arts. 43, 51(3).
Id. art. 52(3).
132 Id. art. 51(5)(b).
1 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, para. 58 n. 106 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/
en/gal-tj031205e.pdf in William J. Fenrick, Riding the Rhino: Attempting to Develop Usable
Legal Standards for Combat Activities, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv.1 11, 124 (2007) (in-
ternal citations omitted).
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planners should consider the long-term effects on the civilian population, in
addition to just a short-term, immediate effect analysis.' 34
During Operation Cast Lead, evidence shows that Israeli military
commanders purposely used a disproportionate amount of force. 13 5 In fact,
Israeli forces adopted the so-called Dahiya doctrine, referring to the Beirut
suburb razed during Israel's military offenses in Lebanon in 2006.' Israeli
military commanders explicitly stated that this doctrine would apply to Ga-
za.13 7 Thus, an Israeli army colonel stated that Israeli forces would adopt
"the principle of a disproportionate strike against the enemy's weak points
as a primary war effort," and that Israeli forces would "need to act imme-
diately, decisively, and with force that is disproportionate to the enemy's
actions and the threat it poses."' 38 Similarly, Israeli Army commander, Gadi
Eisenkot, stated that "[W]e will apply disproportionate force on it and cause
great damage and destruction there."l 3 9 Israeli Prime Minister Olmert as-
serted in January 2009 that there "will be a disproportionate Israeli response
to the fire on the citizens of Israel and its security forces." 4 0 Finally, Israeli
Foreign Affairs Minister, Tzipi Livni, stated that Israel, if fired upon, would
respond by "going wild" and that this was a "good thing."'41
It is possible and probable that Israel gained some military advan-
tage from some of the attacks on Gaza. However, there is serious doubt
whether Operation Cast Lead truly diminished Hamas' military capacity. 4 2
Moreover, "whatever discrete military advantage was gained by these large-
scale attacks was dwarfed by the chaos and bloodshed that it meant for the
civilian population." 4 3 It is true that military forces are not obligated under
international humanitarian law to expose themselves to unnecessary risk of
134 See, e.g., Virgil Wiebe, Footprints ofDeath: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate Weapons
under International Humanitarian Law, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 85, 103 n.62 (2000).
135 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 85.
136 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHY THEY DIED: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN LEBANON DURING
THE 2006 WAR 73-75 (2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
lebanon0907.pdf (describing the disproportionate use of force in Dahieh).
137 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 85.
138 Gabriel Siboni, Disproportionate Force: Israel's Concept of Response in Light of the
Second Lebanon War, INSS INSIGHT No. 74 (Oct. 2, 2008), http://www.inss.org.il/
publications.php?cat-2 1 &incat-&read=2222.
9 Joseph Nasr, Israel Warns Hezbollat War Would Invite Destruction, REUTERS, Oct. 3,
2008, available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKTRE4923I020081003.
140 Rockets hit Israel, Prime Minister Olmert Vows "Disproportionate" Response, THE
TELEGRAPH, Feb. 1, 2009, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
middleeast/israel/4420172/=Rockets-hit-Israel-Prime-Minister-Olmert-vows-
disproportionate-response.html.
141 Kim Sengupta & Donald Macintyre, Israeli Cabinet Divided Over Fresh Gaza Surge,
THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 13, 2009, at 20, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/middle-east/israeli-cabinet-divided-over-fresh-gaza-surge-1332024.html.
142 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 86.
143 Id.
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death of injury. However, compliance with the principle of proportionality
does entail a willingness to accept some casualties in order to limit civilian
suffering.'44 Unfortunately, Israeli actions in Gaza indicate that Israel did
not accept casualties on its own side, and, as a result, countless civilians
died. Consequently, Israel did not respect the principle of proportionality.
Israel's goal in Operation Cast Lead was to restore its "deterrent capacity"
in the Gaza Strip. 145 This goal appears both legally and morally problematic,
and does not meet the definition of a direct military advantage.146
Though there is no requirement under the proportionality rule that
damage to both sides be equivalent, the catastrophic losses suffered by
Palestinian civilians, compared to dubiously classified military objectives
and questionable military advantage Israel received from these attacks, it is
fair to conclude that disproportionate force was clearly used in this con-
flict.147
1. Israeli use of illegal and/or indiscriminate weapons
Under international humanitarian law, certain weapons are prohi-
bited because they cause excessive injuries and/or unnecessary suffering.148
Moreover, some weapons, because they are indiscriminate in nature, may
only be used if there is no other military alternative and when extraordinary
care is undertaken to prevent harm to civilians.149 Eyewitness reports from
the Gaza Strip suggest that Israel used illegal weapons during Operation
Cast Lead in densely populated civilian areas.150
Article 32(1) of Additional Protocol I prohibits "weapons, projec-
tiles, and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering."' 5 ' A more specific convention, the Con-
vention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, consisting of an umbrella treaty and five protocols
also bans weapons that are indiscriminate or that cause unnecessary suffer-
ing.152 Israel is a party to this treaty.' 53
'4 Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy, supra note 128, at 548.
145 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 87.
146 Id.
147 id.
148 Id. at 92.
149 id.
150 Id.
's' Additional Protocol I, supra note 107, art. 35(2).
152 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Wea-
pons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 7 reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1523.
" Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian
Law and Other Related Treaties as of 14-Sep-201 0, http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/
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The Israeli government admitted that its forces may have used
white phosphorous shells in their attacks in Gaza.1 54 White phosphorous
shells may not be used in densely populated areas, because their explosion
results in an indiscriminate scattering of fragments, causing severe bums to
human tissue and thus superfluous injury and suffering to civilians.'5 ' How-
ever, eyewitness accounts confirm that white phosphorous shells were fired
upon heavily populated civilian areas in Gaza:15 6 "The allegations of [white
phosphorous] shells being fired at civilian targets indicate that there may
have been serious breaches of international law by Israeli forces in the Gaza
Strip."1
Israeli forces may have illegally used two other kinds of weapons in
Gaza during Operation Cast Lead: flechettes and Dense Inert Metal Explo-
sive (DIME). Flechettes are metal darts, pointed at the front with four fins at
the rear.1 8 Several thousand flechettes are packed into a shell, which is gen-
erally fired out of a tank, scattering over a large area.1 59 While flechettes are
not a prohibited weapon per se in international law, they are indiscriminate
in nature and many agree that their use should be prohibited in densely po-
pulated civilian areas. 16 0 There is strong evidence suggesting that Israel did
use flechettes in civilian areas in Gaza, in an indiscriminate manner, which
would be a breach of international law.16 1
DIMEs are dispersed through shells that expel "a blade of charged
tungsten dust that burns and destroys everything within a four-metre ra-
dius." 62 DIMEs are extremely lethal, but very precise and thus designed for
use in populated urban areas.163 DIMEs also contain radioactive materials,
which can cause long-term effects on victims, such as cancer.'6 Because
DIMEs are still an experimental weapon, their use is not prohibited by in-
party main treaties/$File/IHL andotherrelatedTreaties.pdf.
54 Peter Beaumont, Israel Admits Troops May Have Used Phosphorus Shells in Gaza, THE
GUARDIAN, Jan. 21, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/21/gaza-phosphorus-
shells.
155 Outcry Over Weapons Used in Gaza, AL JAZEERA, Jan. 19, 2009, http://english.
aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2009/01/200911916132228885.html [hereinafter Outcry Over
Weapons].
156 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 94.
1s7 Id.
158 Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Israeli Army Used Flechettes Against Gaza Civilians (Jan.
27, 2009), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/israeli-army-used-flechettes-
against-gaza-civilians-20090127.
159 Id.
160 Jonathan Cook, Israeli Weaponry Under Scrutiny, THE NATIONAL, Jan. 12, 2009, avail-
able at http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090112/FOREIGN/1505658
37.
1 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 95.
162 Outcry Over Weapons, supra note 155.
163 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 96.
164 Outcry Over Weapons, supra note 155.
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temational law. 165 However, their use is subject to all the rules of interna-
tional humanitarian law; for example, they are not to be used against civi-
lians, who are never legitimate targets.166 Reports from the Gaza Strip sug-
gest that Israeli forces may have used DIMEs against civilians, which would
be a violation of international law.
Details in the reports thus far indicate that Israel may have violated
multiple provisions of international law by using these weapons, including
the targeting of civilians and civilian objects, using weapons that cause su-
perfluous harm or unnecessary suffering, using weapons that are indiscrimi-
nate in nature, and failing to allow for the medical attention to the wounded
required by their condition. 167
2. Overall death and destruction in Gaza
The number of Gazan victims caused by Operation Cast Lead, as
well as the extensive infrastructure damage, suggest that Israel's attack on
Gaza was indiscriminate, and that the amount of force used by Israel was
disproportional. U.N. Secretary-General, Ban-ki Moon, described the scene
in Gaza after Operation Cast Lead as "shocking and alarming." 6 s A U.N.
Emergency Relief Coordinator stated that "it is shocking that civilians suf-
fered so disproportionately in this military operation."l 6 9 More than 1,400
Gazans died during Operation Cast Lead and more than 5,000 were injured;
a number of people may have died in the aftermath of the military operation
itself, or may be simply unaccounted for. 170 The health situation in Gaza is
precarious, as many Gazan hospitals suffered damage in this war.171 The
Israeli army destroyed many private homes and residences, and most Ga-
zans have had to live in shelters and other kinds of temporary housing. 172
Schools were destroyed and, in general, Gaza's infrastructure and its indus-
trial sector have been obliterated. 173 Rebuilding Gaza will require billions of
165 Cook, supra note 160.
166 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 96.
16 Id. at 98.
168 UN to Embark on Humanitarian Assessment in Post-Conflict Gaza, UN NEWS CENTRE
(Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.un.org/news/dh/pdf/english/2009/21012009.pdf.
169 Press Release, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
Situation Report on the Humanitarian Situation in the Gaza Strip, Situation Report No. 16
(Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/retrieveattachments?openagent&shortid
=MUMA7NL4K5&file=FullReport.pdf.
170 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 98.
171 Press Release, World Health Org., Health Action in Crises: Health Situation in Gaza
(Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/wbgs/sitreps/gaza_4feb2009/en/
index.html.
172 Bisharat, supra note 14, at 99.
17 Id. at 99-100.
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dollars in foreign aid. 174 In sum, Operation Cast Lead, through its excessive
nature, caused unnecessary civilian suffering and damage. Israel thus vi-
olated international humanitarian law and should seriously consider provid-
ing some form of accountability for its actions.
IV. THE GOLDSTONE REPORT: FACT-FINDING, CONCLUSIONS,
RECOMMENDATIONS
In the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead, the HRC formally charged
Justice Richard Goldstone, one of the most prominent international jurists of
our time, with a mandate "to investigate all violations of international hu-
man rights law and international humanitarian law that might have been
committed at any time in the context of the military operations that were
conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 December 2008 and 18 Janu-
ary 2009, whether before, during or after."' 75 On September 15, 2009, the
Goldstone Report was released.'7 6 It is a comprehensive document of nearly
600 pages, divided into twenty-one chapters.' 7 7 Sixteen chapters deal with
Israeli abuses of international law, while five deal with abuses committed
by "armed groups in Gaza" and the Palestinian Authority.178 Justice Gold-
stone himself explained this disparity by indicating that Hamas' attacks on
southern Israel were virtually undisputed, whereas Israeli attacks on Gaza
were heavily disputed.17 9 Thus, the Goldstone Report chose to focus on the
latter. In order to investigate violations of international law in Gaza, Justice
Goldstone requested cooperation from both parties; only Hamas accepted,
while Israel consistently refuses to cooperate.18 0
The Goldstone Mission, in order to address possible violations,
chose to investigate several "illustrative" incidents, which were exemplary
of what had taken place in Gaza.18 The Goldstone Report ultimately con-
174 Id. at 100 (noting that foreign donors may be deterred by the prospect of another future
destructive war in Gaza).
17 U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab
Territories: Rep. of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 1 131-
32, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org
/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/docs/UNFFMGC Report.pdf [hereinafter Gold-
stone Report] (appointing Justice Goldstone and three other members to the U.N. Mission).
176 David Kaye, The Goldstone Report, 13 ASIL INSIGHTS (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.asil.
org/files/insight091001pdf.pdf.
'7 Id. at 2 (characterizing the Goldstone Report).
178 Id.
' UN Finds Evidence of War Crimes in Gaza Fighting: Interview with Richard Gold-
stone, PBS NEWSHOUR WITH JiM LEHRER (Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/news
hour/bb/middle east/july-dec09/gaza 09-15.html (Justice Richard Goldstone in a television
interview regarding the U.N. fact-finding Mission report on the Israeli campaign in Gaza).
Iso Kaye, supra note 176, at 2 (without Israeli cooperation the Mission investigation still
faced barriers in Gaza even with Hamas' offered cooperation).
1'" Id at 2.
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cludes that both sides violated international humanitarian law. 2 With re-
spect to Hamas and other armed groups in Gaza, the Goldstone Report al-
leges their responsibility with respect to the targeting of civilians and their
failure to adequately take precautions to protect civilians.' 83 The Goldstone
Report recommends that Hamas and other groups attempt to respect interna-
tional humanitarian law in the future.184 With respect to Israel, the Gold-
stone Report is critical of a number of acts, ranging from abusive deten-
tions, to repression of dissent.'85 Moreover, the Goldstone Report describes
thirty-six different incidents, which all include some form of illegal attacks
on civilians by the Israeli forces, either in the form of indiscriminate or dis-
proportionate use of force, or deliberate attacks on civilian objectives.'8 6
The Goldstone Report also alleges the use of Palestinian civilians as "hu-
man shields" during Operation Cast Lead.' 87 The Report ultimately finds
many different violations of international humanitarian law, as well as poss-
ible elements of war crimes. ss Most importantly, the Goldstone Report
concludes that Operation Cast Lead was directed against the people of Gaza
on the whole, as part of "an overall policy aimed at punishing the Gaza
population for its resilience and for its apparent support for Hamas."l 89
Thus, according to the Goldstone Report, Operation Cast Lead was the re-
sult of-an Israeli policy of "massive and deliberate destruction."' 90
182 id.
18 Goldstone Report, supra note 175, 11721, at 473 (finding that the Palestinian armed
groups failed in their duty to protect and respect civilians); Id. 1 494, at 150 (failing to take
all feasible precautions would have constituted a violation of the customary rules of interna-
tional humanitarian law); Id. 1337, at 373 (Hamas violated international humanitarian law
through its prolonged detention of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit); Id. 1365, at 381 (Hamas
violated human rights by the targeting of Fatah associates).
'84 Id., 1770, at 551 (recommending that Palestinian armed groups, "undertake forthwith
to respect international humanitarian law, in particular by renouncing attacks on Israeli civi-
lians and civilian objects, and take all feasible precautionary measures to avoid harm to Pal-
estinian civilians during hostilities").
181 Id, 1 1098, at 298 (finding that Israel coerced detainees); Id. 1165-1173, at 322-24
(Israel's interrogation and treatment of detainees violated numerous international conven-
tions and constituted war crimes); Id. 1 1520, at 419 (Israeli detention practices violated
international human rights and humanitarian law); Id. 1796-1805, at 492-94 (concluding
that the Mission has insufficient information to come to definitive findings but also criticiz-
ing Israel's alleged actions as a "substantial cause for concern").
Kaye, supra note 176, at 2.
187 Goldstone Report, supra note 175, 11 1094-97, 1101, at 296-99 (Israel's alleged use of
human shields was an intentional war crime and a violation of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion).
188 Kaye, supra note 176.
189 Goldstone Report, supra note 175, 1680-81, at 523.
o90 Id. 1190, at 329 (after reviewing the available information and without collaboration
with the Israeli military the Mission found a qualitative policy shift toward "massive and
deliberate destruction").
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The Goldstone Report called for accountability on behalf of all the
parties involved. It specifically rejected the Israeli claim that it would inves-
tigate violations of international humanitarian law independently, and sug-
gested alternatives to domestic justice.' 9 ' These alternatives include Securi-
ty Council monitoring, an ICC investigation, and the exercise of universal
jurisdiction by other states interested in prosecuting Israeli officials. 192
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GOLDSTONE REPORT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Goldstone Report may have limited influence in Israel and may
not provoke much change in the Israeli military and foreign policy. Howev-
er, the Report, and more specifically its recommendations related to accoun-
tability, may morph into an important international document, and a possi-
ble precedent for other conflicts and accountability demands.
First, the Goldstone Report provides extensive documentation on
Operation Cast Lead, thereby facilitating the investigative task for any other
country willing to prosecute Israeli officials in its domestic courts under
universal jurisdiction statutes.19 3 In other words, the Goldstone Report may
have heightened the risk for Israel that another sovereign state will choose
to prosecute its political or military leaders.194 Second, the Goldstone Report
recommendation that the Security Council establish an independent expert
committee to monitor Israeli efforts to hold violators accountable suggests a
possible new mechanism for pushing Israel into compliance with interna-
tional humanitarian law. While it is probable that this recommendation will
not be followed, because of the U.S. veto power on the Security Council, it
nonetheless describes a novel monitoring scheme that may be useful in the
future.' 95 Third, although the Goldstone Report recommendation that the
Security Council refer this situation to the ICC is certain to fail, also be-
cause of a probable U.S. veto, the Report highlights the need to involve the
ICC and possibly put more pressure on Israel to comply with international
humanitarian law, in order to avoid ICC scrutiny.
Finally, the Goldstone Report draws attention the Gazan blockade
and occupation, and contributes to a deterioration of Israeli reputation
abroad. The recent incident involving the Israeli killing of nine individuals
aboard one of the flotilla ships carrying humanitarian aid to Gaza continues
to paint Israel in a negative light and to incite more international support for
the Gazan issue. 196 Israel, by choosing not to cooperate with the Goldstone
191 Id. 1629, at 508.
192 Id. 1766, at 546-47; Id. 1654, at 515.
193 Kaye, supra note 176.
194 Id.
195 Id. (noting that this recommendation is unlikely to be adopted by the Security Council).
196 See Teibel & Goldenberg, supra note 1 (noting that several states have condemned
Israel's response and called for international investigations).
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Mission, forfeited the chance to advance its own arguments and to portray
itself in a serious and credible light.197 By not cooperating with the Gold-
stone Mission, Israel may have confirmed the Goldstone Report's rejection
of Israel as a possible forum for any investigations of international law vi-
olations. The HRC's endorsement of the Goldstone Report is another signif-
icant fact contributing to the overall importance of this document in interna-
tional law. 19 8
VI. CONCLUSION
The Goldstone Report sheds light on Operation Cast Lead, a deadly
and destructive military offensive in Gaza initiated by Israeli forces over a
three-week period in late 2008 and early 2009.199 Because Israel likely
committed numerous violations of international humanitarian law, it is im-
perative that justice and accountability prevail through a formal, indepen-
dent investigation. Thus, the Goldstone Report recommendations may be
useful in providing models for such investigations and accountability me-
chanisms. Moreover, the world community should turn its attention to the
issue of Gaza, and the overall Israeli military policy toward this entity. The
recent flotilla killings illuminate the tensions between Israel and any state or
entity willing to help Gaza. This incident, coupled with Operation Cast
Lead, underlines the need to seriously address the issue of Gazan blockade,
and to persuade Israel into more flexible solutions. The Goldstone Report's
ultimate achievement may lie within its possible contribution toward a polit-
ically tenable solution for the Middle East.
197 Kaye, supra note 176.
198 Ronen, supra note 7, at 5.
'9 Id. at 3.
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